Viele Glaubensbegründungen setzen auf einem Offenbarungsbegriff auf.
San Jose Zu den unterschiedlichen Lebensformen gehören auch unterschiedliche Prozeduren der Begründung und Unterscheidung zwischen dem, was einer Begründung bedarf und was nicht.
Finden Sie in der Nomos eLibrary eBooks & ePaper zum Thema Philosophie/Praktische Philosophie/Religionsphilosophie. Entdecken Sie unser großes Angebot an.
Religionsphilosophie. Die Religions philosophie ist eine philosophische Disziplin, die die Erscheinungsformen und den theoretischen Gehalt von Religion bzw. Religionen zum Gegenstand hat. Sie versucht, systematisch und rational Antwort zu geben auf Fragen nach der Vernünftigkeit religiöser Aussagen, nach Wesen und Formen von Religionen und ihrer ...
Religionsphilosophie Auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage ...
Definition German noun Religionsphilosophie: dasjenige philosophische Denken, das die with definitions, descriptions, explanations, synonyms and grammatical information in the dictionary.
Religionsphilosophie Definition. Inhaltsverzeichnis
Please note that your registration does not automatically provide Religionsphilosophie Definition to the content of this platform.
Please enter Religionsphilosophie Definition email address below. We will send you an email with further instructions. You will then be prompted to create a new password for your digital account. Open Access. Type comment educational book Book Titles Edited Book Journal Issues. Traffic Law Show all. European Union Show all European Integration: History European Union Law European Union Law Show all Commercial Law, Private Law, Gabriella Fox Blowjob Law Competition Law.
Philosophy Show all Practical Philosophy Practical Philosophy Show all Ethics Political Philosophy Philosophy of Law Philosophy of History Philosophy of Religion Philosophy of Culture Social Philosophy.
Theoretical Philosophy Show all Epistemology Philosophy of Science Metaphysics. European Union Law, European Politics europa ethnica integration JEIH Journal of European Integration History OER Osteuropa Recht SEER Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe ZEuS Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien. Zeitschrift für Flucht- und Flüchtlingsforschung ZfGen Zeitschrift für Genozidforschung ZfP Zeitschrift für Politik ZIB Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen ZParl Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen.
Economics Die Unternehmung JEEMS Journal of East European Management Studies mrev management revue WSI-Mitteilungen Z'GuG Zeitschrift für Gemeinwirtschaft und Gemeinwohl zfwu Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Unternehmensethik ZögU Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen.
Psychology Freie Assoziation Jahrbuch der Religionsphilosophie Definition Psychoanalyse im Widerspruch Psychoanalytische Familientherapie psychosozial Psychotherapie Psychotherapie im Alter. Archive Europarecht EuR PVS Politische Vierteljahresschrift VN Vereinte Nationen ZeFKo Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung ZPB Zeitschrift für Politikberatung ZPol Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft ZSE Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften Journal Religionsphilosophie Definition Comparative Government and European Policy.
Language german english. Home Reihe Bishie Framing-Effekte Definition von Frames. Save Reset filter. Select all Select all. Available Auswählen. Harald MehlichJürgen Postler. Martin Sommer. Series: Recht und Digitalisierung Digitization and the Law. Volume 4 Nomos, Baden-Baden. Ekkehard Strauss. Series: The United Nations and Global Change.
Volume 2 Nomos, Baden-Baden. Paddy Kinyera. Series: Bayreuther Studien zu Politik und Gesellschaft in Afrika Bayreuth Studies in African Politics and Societies. Volume 7 Nomos, Baden-Baden. Sozialwirtschaft aktuell SWa Browse Volumes: Sozialwirtschaft aktuell SWa. Sozialwirtschaft aktuell Volume 30 Issue 19 ISSN Online: Nomos, Baden-Baden.
Hume adds a further set of objections relating to the morally pernicious aspects of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.
Among the several arguments that he puts forward on this score, four points are especially important. In the first place, Hume asks, what is the point or purpose of punishment in a future state? In this life we assume that punishment must not only be deserved, it must also achieve some relevant social end or value e.
When we are removed from this world these goals are taken away and punishment becomes pointlessly retributive ESY, The implication of this is that punishment without any further point or purpose is mere vengeance that lacks any proper justification.
Second, Hume asks on what basis God determines the extent of our merit and demerit. Among human beings the standard of merit and demerit depends on our moral sentiments and our sense of pleasure and pain. Are we to suppose that God also has human passions and feelings of this kind? ESY, ,; cp. LET, I, 40 [ 16]; D, 3.
But the greatest part of mankind float between vice and virtue. From every point of view this doctrine is considered unsound.
It depends on metaphysical assumptions about the nature of mind soul that are philosophically unconvincing, involving obscure ideas that are plainly at odds with our everyday experience and observations concerning the relationship between mind and body. Finally, not only is this doctrine considered by Hume to be philosophically flawed and psychologically feeble, it depends on moral principles that are both unjust and corrupting.
This project follows lines of investigation and criticism that had already been laid down by a number of other thinkers, including Lucretius, Hobbes and Spinoza. Related to this point, Hume also wants to show that the basic forces in human nature and psychology that shape and structure religious belief are in conflict with each other and that, as a result of this, religious belief is inherently unstable and variable. In arguing for these points, Hume is directly challenging an opposing view, one that was widely held among his own orthodox contemporaries.
According to this view e. Belief in an intelligent, invisible creator and governor of the world is a universal belief rooted in and supported by reason. According to Hume, all that the various religions in the world have in common is belief that there is an invisible, intelligent power in the world NHR, Intro, 4. In several different contexts in The Natural History of Religion Hume suggests that the argument from design — based on our observation of beauty and order in the world — is a convincing and plausible basis for genuine theism NHR, Intro, 6.
However, despite this veil of orthodoxy, his objective throughout this work is to show that the actual foundation of genuine theism, as we find it in the world, does not rest with reasoning or arguments of any kind.
The true roots of genuine theism can be discovered in the psychological dynamics that first give rise to polytheism. The same irrational forces that shape polytheism serve to explain the rise of theism and the instability and variations that we discover within it.
Not only does the evidence of history make this clear Hume discounts the historical reliability of the Hebrew Bible, which, as is well-known, presents a different picture , we know as well that if theism, based on the obvious and convincing argument of design, were the original religion then it would be impossible to explain how polytheism could have ever arisen out of it.
That is to say, the argument from design would continue to have the same force and so we should not expect any deviation from it. What, then, is the origin of polytheism? These are events e. By this means, human beings hope to control what they do not understand and are afraid of.
As a result of this process, as shaped by human fears and ignorance, the world becomes populated with human-like invisible, intelligent powers that are objects of worship. The religion of polytheism is very different from genuine theism in so far as it does not concern itself with the abstract and speculative question concerning the origin or supreme government of the universe.
These are questions that primitive people who are struggling for their daily survival do not have time to speculate about. The question that Hume now turns to is how theism arose from polytheism. In respect of this issue, Hume observes that there are two conflicting tendencies in human nature. These conflicting demands are best satisfied by representing the various gods as something like ourselves and attributing particular qualities and attributes to them that are relevant to their specific sphere of influence e.
Over time, among the vulgar, one of these gods will gradually emerge as a particular object of veneration and worship. In their anxiety to please and praise this god, worshippers will continually try to outdo their predecessors by attributing greater and greater powers and perfections to him.
At last they will reach a point where they represent this god as infinite and entirely perfect, whereby they render his nature inexplicable and mysterious. This conflict, as Hume explains it, has deep roots in the dynamics of human nature and our conflicting propensities. The result of this process is an inherent instability in theism itself. On the one side, there is a tendency, originally present in polytheism, to anthropomorphize the gods in the hope of placating and controlling them.
This influence of the human passions and propensities affects the stability of our idea of God in another way. Our natural fear of future events encourages a conception of God that is severe and cruel.
Clearly, the general point that Hume aims to establish by means of these observations is that the natural sources of religion are in conflict with one another and generate a continual cycle of opposition and instability in our religious beliefs and idea of god. The origins of religious belief rest with human fear and ignorance, which gives rise, in the first place, to polytheism.
The same psychological forces that give rise to polytheism gradually transform it into a system of theism. This system of theism is, however, itself a product of conflicting tendencies in human nature that result in an unstable oscillation between anthropomorphic and mystical ideas of god.
The conclusion that Hume draws from all this is that religion generally rests on human weaknesses and vulnerabilities and that reason has little influence over its evolution or stability. Richard Bentley, the first Boyle lecturer, neatly states the view that many theists hold concerning the relationship between religion and morality:. The general view defended by Bentley, and many other apologists for religion, is that without religious principles and institutions to guide and motivate us, the moral world will collapse into nihilism, egoism and the arbitrary rule of power.
The foundation of this, however, rests with egoism and moral scepticism. That is to say, according to Hobbes, human nature is driven by psychological egoism and there is no real distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, just or unjust.
On the basis of a naturalistic and necessitarian conception of human nature, Hume aims to show how moral motivation and practice is possible i.
One important element is the role of the indirect passions in accounting for the sanctions and support provided to moral life. A vicious character, he argues, produces hate and humility dishonour and shame that makes us unhappy. In contrast with this, virtue produces love and pride, which makes us happy.
This is the fundamental mechanism by which virtue is rewarded and vice is punished. This mechanism operates no less effectively among atheists, who have no belief in God or a future state, as it does among those with traditional theistic beliefs.
We are naturally constituted, Hume maintains, to share the emotions of our fellow human beings. By means of this principle of sympathy, human beings naturally take an interest in the happiness and welfare of others — especially our family, friends and neighbours.
Hume denies, therefore, that human nature is wholly selfish or without any benevolent concerns or dispositions. At the same time, Hume also emphasizes the point that our sympathetic and benevolent tendencies are limited and highly partial — both of which pose serious obstacles for social peace and cooperation.
In this way, while Hume plainly rejects Hobbist egoism and allows that we are naturally social beings in a number of significant respects i. This is something that we must find a solution to if we are to be able to live together in groups larger than families and small clans.
Our human nature, combining both passions and reason, provides a remedy for this problem. In the first place, Hume denies that we lack any real standard of right and wrong or good and evil.
The relevant standard depends on our sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness T, 3. It is evident that Hume aims to describe a standard of merit and demerit that, although it depends on our given human nature, is in no way arbitrary or without rational constraints.
There are no obligations that we have in respect of these institutions and practices that are prior to or independent of these conventions. The general basis of our commitment to these conventions is that they serve our individual and collective interest. Failing this, we would have no relevant motive to obey these rules of justice. Clearly, then, with respect to property, there are no natural rights or claims of justice outside our created, conventional practices.
On this view of things, God and a future state are wholly unnecessary for moral life and human society. The relevant foundation for moral life and conduct rests with the key elements of human nature that we have mentioned — pride, sympathy, moral sense, and conventions. By these means, we find that human beings are constituted in such a way that they are capable of moral conduct and able to sustain social cooperation and harmony. In developing this account, Hume draws heavily from earlier work by other freethinking, irreligious, and radical philosophers, such as Hobbes, Spinoza, Bayle, and especially Shaftesbury.
Nevertheless, in a variety of contexts, Hume does maintain that religion — especially monotheism — has pernicious and corrupting tendencies. In this context. Hume leaves his readers with the clear view that religion, far from being a source of support for moral practice, is in fact a major source of moral sickness in the world.
Hume returns to these same general themes in the closing passages of the Dialogues. In this context Philo emphasizes the point that the doctrine of a future state has little practical influence over human conduct D, EM, 3.
Beyond all this, he also points out the particular dangers to society of the clergy when they gain too much power and influence D, This is a theme that Hume also touches on throughout many of his other writings, including The Natural History of Religion , several of his essays, and his History of England.
At best, religion has little practical influence in guiding or supporting moral conduct. At its worst, which is how we commonly find it, religious principles and institutions disturb and pervert that natural and reasonable moral standards that human nature has provided us with. Two methodological and historical caveats should be briefly noted before addressing this question. Thomas Reid and, even if it were, it would not show that his critics were wrong about this matter.
Second, and related to the first point, Hume lived and wrote at a time of severe religious persecution, by both the church and the state. Caution and subterfuge in these circumstances was essential if difficulties of these kinds were to be avoided. While conditions of suppression do not themselves prove a writer or thinker such as Hume had a concealed doctrine, this possibility should be seriously and carefully considered. Throughout his writings, while he is certainly concerned to discredit various dogmatic proofs for the existence of God, he also avoids advancing or endorsing any dogmatic atheistic arguments and their conclusions — preferring to suspend all belief on such matters NHR, Clearly major religions like traditional Christianity require a robust conception of God.
That is to say, Hume pursues what we may call the hard skeptical aim of providing grounds for denying the theist hypothesis in its various robust forms. For example, in a number of passages of the Dialogues Hume suggests that the abundant evidence of unnecessary evil provides us with compelling grounds for denying that there exists an omnipotent, morally perfect being who is the creator and governor of this world. In light of these considerations, we may conclude that with respect to robust theism Hume is a hard skeptic who defends a non-dogmatic form of atheism.
While Hume may be a hard skeptic about robust theism, it does not follow that he is either a hard or a soft skeptic about thin theism. The key passages that are generally relied on in support of this view are found in the last section of the Dialogues XII.
NHR, Intro. EU, To strengthen the skeptical side of these reflections Hume has Philo point out that there are other analogies available to us e.
In light of these observations, we may conclude that it is highly problematic to present Hume as any kind of theist, either robust or thin. The question remains, however, whether his final skeptical attitude to thin theism is better understood as hard or soft in character? According to this interpretation, we should accept our epistemological predicament and avoid any final judgment on such matters. The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery.
There are two hard skeptical arguments concerning this hypothesis that are especially important. The first is that Hume points out that our experience suggests that mind is always accompanied by body D, 5. Any reasonable hypothesis, therefore, should be consistent with this aspect of human experience. Although our experience may be narrow and limited, given the nature of the object of our investigations, it nevertheless provides some substantial basis for rejecting or denying the hypothesis of theism, including the thin version.
In particular, we may easily revise the old Epicurean hypothesis of eternal matter that generates cycles of chaos and order D, 6. This is a hypothesis that provides us with natural explanations for forms and orders of life and existence in a manner that clearly anticipates important features of Darwinian theory. His arguments are harder than this and present grounds for denying theism, both robust and thin. In the previous section it was suggested that Hume may be properly described as a hard sceptic who is a non-dogmatic atheist.
This returns us to a point that Hume had made earlier in the Dialogues ; namely, that in both theoretical and practical terms a mystical form of theism — lacking any significant anthropomorphic features — is indistinguishable from a form of scepticism, where all conjectures about the nature of God remain entirely undecided, unknowable and irrelevant to human life D, 6. Thus T,1. In the case of the Enquiries I cite Section and Paragraph; followed by page reference to the Selby-Bigge edition.
Thus EU, The author and editors are grateful to Doug Jesseph for comments on an earlier version of this article. Entry Navigation Entry Contents Bibliography Academic Tools Friends PDF Preview Author and Citation Info Back to Top.
Hume on Religion First published Tue Oct 4, ; substantive revision Mon Mar 27, Religious Philosophers and Speculative Atheists 2. Empiricism, Scepticism and the Very Idea of God 3. The Argument from Design 5. The Problem of Evil 6. Miracles 7. Immortality and a Future State 8. Religion and Morality Was Hume an Atheist?
Whatever we imagine is finite. Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call infinite. No man can have in his mind an image of infinite magnitude, nor conceive infinite swiftness, infinite time, or infinite force, or infinite power … And therefore the name of God is used, not to make us conceive him for he is incomprehensible , and his greatness and power are inconceivable , but that we may honour him.
Also because whatsoever … we conceive has been perceived first by sense, either all at once or by parts, a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense… Hobbes, Leviathan , 3. The Deity is known to us only by his productions, and is a single being in the universe, not comprehended under any species or genus, from whose experienced attributes or qualities, we can, by analogy, infer any attribute or quality in him… EU, In this context, he specifically mentions Clarke and condenses his argument into a few sentences: Whatever exists must have a cause or reason of its existence; it being absolutely impossible for any thing to produce itself, or to be the cause of its own existence.
In mounting up, therefore, from effects to causes, we must either go on in tracing an infinite succession, without any ultimate cause at all, or must at last have recourse to some ultimate cause, that is necessarily existent … D, 9.
On this basis Hume argues: Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition; all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine. In the Dialogues Hume explains his position as follows: … there is an evident absurdity in pretending to demonstrate a matter of fact, or to prove it by arguments a priori.
Nothing is demonstrable, unless the contrary is a contradiction. Nothing, that is directly conceivable, implies a contradiction. Whatever we conceive as existent, we can also conceive as non-existent.
There is no being, therefore, whose non-existence implies a contradiction. Consequently there is no Being whose contradiction is demonstrable. Did I show you the particular cause of each individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts.
But surely, where reasonable men treat these subjects, the question can never be concerning the being, but only the nature of the Deity. The former truth, as you well observe, is unquestionable and self-evident. Nothing exists without a cause; and the original cause of this universe whatever it be we call GOD; and piously ascribe to him every species of perfection.
The curious adapting of means to ends, exceeds the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man ; though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work, which he has executed. The exact similarity of the cases gives us a perfect assurance of a similar event; and a stronger evidence is never desired nor sought after.
But wherever you depart, in the least, from the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence: and may at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and uncertainty. You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You forget, that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions.
Now without some such license of supposition, it is impossible for us to argue from the cause, or infer any alteration in the effect, beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature; and consequently, being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument, can never be admitted but as a mere conjecture and hypothesis.
I will allow, that pain or misery in man is compatible with infinite power and goodness in the Deity, even in your sense of these attributes: What have you advanced by all these concessions? A mere possible compatibility is not sufficient. You must prove these pure unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. I am sceptic enough to allow, that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be compatible with such attributes as you suppose: But surely they can never prove these attributes.
Miracles Miracles are an essential and fundamental element of the major monotheistic religions i. First of all, the »ne bis in idem« principle not only refers to criminal penalties in the strict sense but includes — not unlike the case-law of the ECHR — state actions with a criminal penalty-like character as well.
Secondly, the »idem« strictly means the understanding of the identity of material acts whereas the legal classification of such acts is irrelevant. Thirdly, to guarantee the full effectiveness of »ne bis in idem«, it works within and across countries; in the view of those affected it usually makes no difference where the first criminal prosecution took place. Nevertheless, Art. Registrieren Login. Bedeutung Religionsphilosophie. Was bedeutet Religionsphilosophie?
Hier finden Sie 5 Bedeutungen des Wortes Religionsphilosophie. Sie können auch eine Definition von Religionsphilosophie selbst hinzufügen.
Religionsphilosophie Auf Geschichtlicher Grundlage ...
Religionsphilosophie Auf Geschichtlicher [FACSIMILE]|Otto, Prleiderer Our writers use EBSCO to access and up-to-date materials. If you have a list of required sources handy, feel free to send it over for the writer to follow it. Dictionary › Nouns › Meanings › Religionsphilosophie All Nouns Importance of the German noun Religionsphilosophie. Meaning German noun Religionsphilosophie: dasjenige philosophische Denken, das die Religion zum Objekt des Nachdenkens macht with definitions, descriptions, explanations, synonyms and grammatical information in the explanatory dictionary. 28/06/ · Definition of Religionsphilosophie in the ottavianelli.eu dictionary. Meaning of Religionsphilosophie. Information and translations of Religionsphilosophie in the comprehensive dictionary definitions resource on the web.
Mitglieder A-Z. Registrieren Login. Bedeutung Religionsphilosophie. Was bedeutet Religionsphilosophie? Hier finden Sie 5 Bedeutungen des Wortes Religionsphilosophie. Sie können auch eine Definition von Religionsphilosophie selbst hinzufügen. Wissenschaft vom Ursprung, Wesen und Wahrheitsgehalt der Religionen. Die Religionsphilosophie ist eine philosophische Disziplin, die die Erscheinungsformen und den theoretischen Gehalt von Religion bzw.
Bedeutung von Religionsphilosophie hinzufügen.